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We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard
game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the problem of task allocation in which the private information of
the agents is not only their costs of attempting the tasks but also their probabilities of
failure. For several different instances of this setting we present both, positive results in
the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and eﬃcient,
and negative results in the form of impossibility theorems.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the point of interface between computer science and mechanism design, or MD for short, has been a
site of great activity (e.g. [1,2,4,8,15,16,18,21]). MD, a sub-area of game theory, is the science of crafting protocols for self-
interested agents, and as such is a natural fodder for computer science in general and AI in particular. The uniqueness of
the MD perspective is that it concentrates on protocols for non-cooperative agents. Indeed, traditional game theoretic work
on MD focuses solely on the incentive aspects of the protocols.
A promising application of MD to AI is the problem of task allocation among self-interested agents (see, e.g., [17]). When
only the execution costs are taken into account, the task allocation problem allows standard mechanism design solutions.
However, this setting does not take into consideration the possibility that agents might fail to complete their assigned tasks.
When this possibility is added to the framework, existing results cease to apply. The goal of this paper is to investigate
robustness to failures in the game theoretic framework in which each agent is rational and self-motivated. Speciﬁcally,
we consider the design of protocols for agents that not only have private cost functions, but also have privately-known
probabilities of failure.
What criteria should such protocols meet? Traditional MD has a standard set of criteria for successful outcomes, namely
social eﬃciency (maximizing the sum of the agents’ utilities), individual rationality (positive utility for all participants), and
incentive compatibility (incentives for agents to reveal their private information). Fault Tolerant Mechanism Design (FTMD)
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in UAI 2002 [R. Porter, A. Ronen, Y. Shoham, M. Tennenholtz, Mechanism design with execution
uncertainty, in: Proceedings of UAI-02, 2002]. This version contains proofs that were omitted from the conference version and several new theorems.
In addition, the presentation has been considerably amended.
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of failure in addition to cost). As we will see, this extension presents novel challenges.
To demonstrate the diﬃculties encountered when facing such problems, consider even the simple case of a single task
for which each agent has zero cost and a privately-known probability of success. A straw-man protocol is to ask each agent
for its probability, choose the most reliable agent (according to the declarations) and pay it a ﬁxed, positive amount if it
succeeds, and zero otherwise. Of course, under this protocol, each agent has an incentive to declare a probability of success
of one, in order to maximize its chances of receiving a payment, at no cost to itself.
Before moving to a formal deﬁnition of the problem, it is important to distinguish between different possible failure
types. The focus of this work is on failures that occur when agents make a full effort to complete their assigned tasks, but
may fail. A more nefarious situation would be one in which agents may also fail deliberately when it is rational to do so.
While we do not formally consider this possibility, we will revisit it at the end of the paper to explain why many of our
results hold in this case as well. Finally, one can consider the possibility of irrational agents whose actions are counter to
their best interests. This is the most diﬃcult type of failure to handle, because the presence of such agents can affect the
strategy of rational agents, in addition to directly affecting the outcome. We leave this case to future work.
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper we study progressively more complex task allocation problems. We start with the case of a single task.
Even in this simple setup it is not possible to apply the standard solutions of mechanism design theory (Generalized Vickrey
Auction (GVA)). Informally, the main reason for this is that the value of the center depends on the actual types of the agents
and not just on the chosen allocation. We deﬁne a mechanism SingleTask with properties similar to those of GVA (or
more precisely, to a slightly more general version of GVA that takes the center’s value in account). The mechanism offers
a contract to each agent in which the payment is contingent on whether the task is completed. A mechanism is called
incentive compatible in dominant strategies (DSIC) if the agent always gets a contract that maximizes its expected utility
when declaring its actual type. Similarly, a mechanism is called individually rational (IR) if a truthful agent always gets
a contract that guarantees it a non-negative expected utility. (We stress that agents may end up losing due to their own
failures.) A DSIC mechanism is called ex-post economically eﬃcient (EE) if when the agents are truthful, the mechanism’s
allocation maximizes the expected total welfare, which equals the expected center’s value minus the agents’ costs. Finally,
a DSIC mechanism is ex-post individually rational for the center (CR) if when the agents are truthful, the center’s expected
utility is non-negative, no matter what the actual vector of types is. We deﬁne a mechanism called MultipleTask that
generalizes the previous mechanism to the case of multiple tasks and additive values for the center and show that it
maintains all the above properties.
Theorem. TheMultipleTaskmechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, EE.
We then study more complicated settings in which it is impossible to satisfy all the above properties simultaneously.
In most task allocation situations the value of the center is likely to be combinatorial and not additive (see example in
Section 2.5). Let n denote the number of agents and t the number of tasks. We show the following impossibility theorem:
Theorem.When V is combinatorial, no mechanism exists that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
Fortunately, when CR is relinquished, it is possible to satisfy the other properties.
Theorem. TheMultipleTask mechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, EE, even when V is combinatorial.
Next we study situations in which there are dependencies between tasks. This complicates the setup further because
now the cost of an agent can depend on the actual types of other agents. We show the following impossibility results:
Theorem. When dependencies exist between tasks, even when the center’s valuation is non-combinatorial, no mechanism exists that
satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
Theorem.When dependencies exist between tasks and the center’s valuation is combinatorial, no mechanism exists that satisﬁes DSIC,
IR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
In light of the above theorems we relax our properties to hold only in an ex-post equilibrium. We then present a modi-
ﬁcation of our mechanism called Ex-Post-MultipleTask and show that it satisﬁes the equilibrium version of our properties.
Theorem.Mechanism Ex-Post-MultipleTask satisﬁes ex-post IC, IR, and EE, even when dependencies exist between the tasks and the
center’s valuation is combinatorial.
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end up with large losses. Second, even the expected center’s value may be negative. Our ﬁnal result shows that these draw-
backs can be overcome when it is possible to verify the cost of the agents after the tasks are performed. Given any n positive
constants (χ1, . . . ,χn), we deﬁne a mechanism called Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus. This mechanism is a modiﬁcation of
the compensation and bonus mechanism introduced in [15], adjusted to handle the possibility of failures. Let u∗ denote the
optimal expected welfare. Then:
Theorem. Under the veriﬁcation assumption, Mechanism Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus satisﬁes ex-post IC, IR, EE, and CR, even
when dependencies between the tasks exist and the center’s valuation is combinatorial. Moreover, for every  > 0 and a type vector θ ,
when the constants χi are small enough, the expected center’s utility is at least u∗ · (1− ).
1.2. Related work
The work presented in this paper integrates techniques of economic mechanism design (an introduction to MD can be
found in [12, chapter 23]) with studies of fault tolerant problem solving in computer science and AI.
In particular, the technique used in our mechanism is similar to that of the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) [5,10,20]
in that it aligns the utility of the agents with the overall welfare. (More precisely, our mechanism resembles a generalized
version of GVA that also takes the center’s value into account.) This similarity is almost unavoidable, as this alignment
is perhaps the only known general principle for solving mechanism design problems. However, because we allow for the
possibility of failures, we will need to change the GVA in a signiﬁcant way in order for our mechanisms to achieve this
alignment.
Because we have added probabilities to our setting, our mechanisms may appear to be related to the Expected Externality
Mechanism (or d’AGVA) [6], but there are key differences. In the setting of d’AGVA, the probabilistic component is the
distribution from which the types of the agents are drawn, and this distribution is assumed to be common knowledge
among the participants. The two key differences in our setting are that no such common knowledge assumption is made
and that d’AGVA uses the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium as its solution concept.
A speciﬁc problem of task allocation with failures in the context of networking is studied in [9]. The model and the
questions addressed in this work are very different from ours.
The design of protocols that are robust to failures has a long tradition in computer science (for a survey, see e.g. [11]).
Work in this area, however, almost always assumes a set of agents that are by and large cooperative and adhere to a central
protocol, except for some subset of malicious agents who may do anything to disrupt the protocol. In mechanism design
settings, the participants ﬁt neither of these classes, and all are instead modelled as being self-interested. A paper in the
spirit of computer science that considers failures in mechanism design is [7]. This work assumes that agents know the types
of all other rational agents and limits the failures that can occur by bounding the number of irrational agents. Under these
assumptions, the paper characterizes the set of full Nash implementations.
The problem of procuring a path in a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested parties has received a lot
of attention in recent years (e.g. [1,8,13,15]). It is a private case of the task allocation problem we are studying. The works
mentioned above did not discuss the possibility of failures.
In principle agent problems the agents are required to exert costly efforts in order to perform some joint action. There
is some technical similarities between such problems and ours as, typically, the effort level of each agent affects the over-
all success probability of the joint action. Recently, principle agent problems that incorporate combinatorial aspects were
studied by several researchers (e.g. [3,14,19]). The setup and focus of these papers are essentially different from ours. Our
setting emphasizes the elicitation of private information with regard to the probability of success of task execution, a topic
which to the best of our knowledge has not been treated in the principal-agent and mechanism design literature.
2. The basic model
In this section we describe our basic model. It will be modiﬁed later for more complicated settings. Sections 2.1–2.4
introduce our basic setup, the class of mechanisms we consider and the notations that are related to them, describe the
utilities of the participants and the goals that a mechanism must satisfy. Section 2.5 provides two examples of task allocation
problems.
2.1. Participants
An FTMD problem consists of a set of tasks τ = {1, . . . , t}, a set N = {1, . . . ,n} of self-interested agents to which the
tasks can be assigned, and a center M who assigns tasks to agents and pays them for their work. The center and the agents
will collectively be called the participants.
Prior to acting within the mechanism, each agent i privately observes its type θi ∈ Θi . A type of agent i contains, for
each task j, the probability pij ∈ [0,1] of successfully completing task j, and the non-negative cost ci j ∈ + of attempting
the task. We will represent a type as θi = (pi, ci), where pi = (pi1, . . . , pit) and ci = (ci1, . . . , cit). Throughout the paper we
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1. Privately observes its type θi
2. Declares a type θˆi to the mechanism
3. Is allocated a set f i(θˆ ) of tasks to attempt and is given a contract rˆi(.).
4. Attempts the tasks in f i(θˆ )
5. Receives a payment of rˆi(μ) based on the actual completion vector of all tasks.
Fig. 1. Overview of the setting.
assume the cost of attempting a task is independent of its success probability, that the total agent cost is the sum of the
costs of its attempted tasks, and that all the success probabilities are independent.
Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) denote a proﬁle of types, consisting of one for each agent. We will use θ−i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn)
to denote the same proﬁle without the type of agent i, and θ = (θi, θ−i) as an alternative way of writing the full proﬁle.
For simplicity we assume that each task can be assigned only once. The center does not have to allocate all the tasks.
For notational convenience we assume that all the non-allocated tasks are assigned to a dummy agent 0, which has zero
costs and success probabilities for all tasks. The payment to this dummy agent is always zero.
2.2. Mechanisms
In general, the protocol for the interaction between the agents and the center could be arbitrarily complicated, to consist
of conditional plans of action in a multi-round interaction. A much simpler class of mechanisms to consider is that of direct
mechanisms. A direct mechanism Γ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn, g(·)) is a mechanism in which each agent i, after observing its type,
declares a type θˆ to the center (we will later justify this restriction). The function g : Θ1 × · · · ×Θn → O maps the declared
types of the agents to an output o ∈ O , where an output o = ( f1, . . . , fn, rˆ1(·), . . . , rˆn(·)) speciﬁes both the allocation and the
payment function (contract) given to each agent. We now elaborate on our notation regarding allocation, task completion,
and payment.
Each f i(θˆ ) records the set of tasks assigned to agent i when θˆ is the vector of declared types. An agent i then incurs a
cost ci( f i(θˆ )) =∑ j∈ f i(θˆ ) ci j to attempt this set. The whole allocation is denoted by f .
We let μi = (μi1, . . . ,μit) denote the actual completion vector for agent i (i.e., μi j = 1 if agent i completed task j, and
μi j = 0 if agent i either failed to complete or was not assigned task j). To aggregate the completion vectors across all agents,
we will use μ for a vector of t terms. Each coordinate μ j speciﬁes whether task j was completed.
An allocation f and a vector of success probabilities p for the agents deﬁne a probability distribution over the possible
completion vectors. We denote this probability by μ f (p). Note that this distribution depends on the actual types of the
agents but not on their costs.
Given the vector of agent declarations θˆ , the mechanism gives a contract rˆi(.) to each agent i. The actual payment rˆi(μ)
given to the agent is a function of the completed tasks by all agents. (Sometimes, it is possible to condition this payment on
μi only.) We let ri(θˆ ,μ) =df rˆi(μ) denote a function that maps both, the vector of declarations and the actual completion
vector, to the agent’s payment.
Fig. 1 summarizes the setting from the perspective of an individual agent i.
Notation. Let D be a distribution and X a random variable over D. We let ED[X] denote the expected value of X taken
over D. In particular, given an allocation f and a vector of agents’ completion probabilities p, we let Eμ f (p)[F (μ)] denote
the expected value of F (μ) where μ is distributed according to μ f (p). We note that p is not necessarily the true completion
vector.
2.3. Participant utilities
Agent i’s utility function, ui(g(θˆ),μ, θi) = rˆi(μ) − ci( f i(θˆ )), is the difference between its payment and the actual cost of
attempting its assigned tasks. Such a utility function is called quasi-linear.
Since our setting is stochastic by nature, the deﬁnitions need to take into account the agent’s attitude towards lotter-
ies. We adopt the common assumption that the participants are risk neutral. We leave the relaxation of this assumption
to future research. A proﬁle of allocations f = ( f1, . . . , fn) and a proﬁle of true probabilities p together induce a proba-
bility distribution μ f (p) over completion vectors. Hence, an agent’s expected utility, in equilibrium and before any job is
attempted, equals ui = ui(θˆ) = Eμ f (p)[ui(g(θˆ),μ, θi)]. Each agent i thus tries to maximize its expected utility ui . Note that
this deﬁnition is only with regard to the interim outcome of the mechanism (the contracts) as the agent cannot even know
whether its own attempts will succeed.
The function V (μ) deﬁnes the center’s non-negative valuation for each possible completion vector. We normalize the
function so that V (0, . . . ,0) = 0. For now, we assume that the center has a non-combinatorial valuation for a set of tasks.
That is, for all T ⊆ τ , V (T ) =∑ j∈T V ({ j}).
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makes to the agents: uM(g(θˆ),μ) = V (μ) −∑i rˆi(μ).
The total welfare W of the participants is equal to the value to the center of the completed tasks, minus the costs in-
curred by the agents. Given an allocation f and a vector of true types (p, c), the expected total welfare Eμ f (θ)(p)[W ( f (θ),μ)]
thus equals Eμ f (p)[V (μ) −
∑
i ci( f i)].
2.4. Mechanism goals
Our aim in each setting is to construct mechanisms that satisfy the following four goals: incentive compatibility, individ-
ual rationality (for the agents), individual rationality for the center, and economic eﬃciency. We stress that since the agents
only have probabilistic information about their success, our deﬁnitions are ex-ante, meaning that the agents get the best
contracts when they declare their actual types and the mechanism chooses an allocation that maximizes the expected total
welfare.
Deﬁnition 1 (Incentive compatibility in dominant strategies). A direct mechanism satisﬁes dominant strategy incentive compati-
bility (DSIC) if for every agent i, type θi , possible declaration θ ′i , and vector of declarations for the other agents θˆ−i , it holds
that:
Eμ f ((θi ,θˆ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g
(
(θi, θˆ−i)
)
,μ, θi
)]
 Eμ f ((θ ′i ,θˆ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g
(
(θ ′i , θˆ−i)
)
,μ, θi
)]
.
In other words, for every agent i, no matter what the types and declarations of the other agents are, the agent gets the
best contract when it is truthful (i.e. a contract that maximizes the agent’s expected utility over its own failure probabilities).
Since, an agent’s utility depends only on the declarations of the other agents but not on their actual types, these types are
omitted from the deﬁnition above.
Remarks. While restricting ourselves to direct mechanisms may seem limiting at ﬁrst, the Revelation Principle for Dominant
Strategies (see, e.g., [12]) tells us that we can make this restriction without loss of generality. Note that the optimality of
being truthful does not rely on any belief that the agent may have about the types or the declarations of the other agents
(as opposed to Bayesian–Nash mechanisms).
The next property guarantees that the expected utility of a truthful agent is always non-negative. This means that it is
beneﬁcial for the agents to participate in the mechanism.
Deﬁnition 2 (Individual rationality). A direct mechanism satisﬁes individual rationality (IR) if:
∀i, θ, θˆ−i : Eμ f ((θi ,θˆ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g
(
(θi, θˆ−i)
)
,μ, θi
)]
 0.
In other words, when the agent is truthful, its contract guarantees it a non-negative expected utility. We stress that
agents may end up with a negative utility and even with a negative payment. It is possible to ﬁx this by adding to each
agent an amount of money equaling the supremum of possible costs that the agent may have given the reports of the other
agents, i.e. supθi ci( f i((θi, θˆ−i))). However, the addition of such a constant will imply unacceptably high payments that will
destroy other properties of the mechanism.
Deﬁnition 3 (Center’s rationality). A direct mechanism satisﬁes ex-post individual rationality for the center (CR) if it satisﬁes
DSIC and if:
∀θ : Eμ f (θ)(p)
[
uM
(
g(θ),μ
)]
 0.
In other words, when the agents are truthful, the allocation guarantees the center a non-negative expected utility.
Our ﬁnal goal is to maximize the expected welfare of the participants.
Deﬁnition 4 (Economic eﬃciency). A direct mechanism satisﬁes ex-post economic eﬃciency (EE) if it satisﬁes DSIC and if:
∀θ, f ′: Eμ f (θ)(p)
[
W
(
f (θ),μ
)]
 Eμ f ′ (p)
[
W ( f ′,μ)
]
.
We let f ∗(θ) denote an allocation that maximizes the expected welfare of the participants.
2.5. Examples of task allocation problems
We now provide two examples of task allocation problems. The ﬁrst one falls into our basic framework. The second
example demonstrates additional aspects of task allocation problems. These will be addressed in Section 4.
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S A A1 300 100 0.8
S A A2 300 80 0.7
SB A1 200 100 0.8
SB A2 200 90 0.9
Fig. 2. Outsourcing example.
2.5.1. Outsourcing of independent projects
Consider a company that would like to outsource two large independent projects S A and SB . The company has business
relationships with two potential contractors, A1 and A2, which are able to perform these projects. The values of the company
(which is the center here), and the costs and success probabilities of the agents (potential contractors) are described in Fig. 2.
Suppose that the center allocates S A to A1 and SB to A2. This allocation and the actual types of the agents deﬁne
the following distribution on the completion vectors: Pr[(1,1)] = 0.72, Pr[(1,0)] = 0.08, Pr[(0,1)] = 0.18, Pr[(0,0)] = 0.02.
Thus, the expected center’s value is E[V (μ)] = 0.72 · 500 + 0.08 · 300 + 0.18 · 200 + 0.02 · 0 = 420. The total agent cost
equals 190 and thus the expected welfare equals 230. Suppose that agent A1 receives the following contract (depending
on its completion vector μ1 only): rˆ1({1}) = 200 and rˆ1({0}) = 0. The agent’s cost is 100 and thus its expected utility is
u1 = 0.8 · 200− 100 = 60.
Why focus on incentive compatible mechanisms? In a mechanism design setup, the behavior of the participants is determined
by the selﬁsh considerations of the agents and is not controlled by the mechanism. This behavior has a crucial effect on
the outcomes of the mechanism. Consider, for instance, the following protocol for the outsourcing problem: The agents
ﬁrst declare their types; the mechanism then computes the allocation that maximizes the expected welfare according to θˆ
and pays 200 per each completed task. In such a case an agent with a low cost for a task will declare a high reliability
even if its actual reliability is small. This can severely damage the center’s value. In general, the behavior of the agents in
arbitrary protocols is highly unpredictable, depending on their beliefs, risk attitudes, computational and cognitive ability, etc.
Thus, the standard approach in mechanism design, which we adopt, is to focus on mechanisms that admit speciﬁc solution
concepts that make them more predictable (incentive compatible mechanisms).
Why can GVA mechanisms not be applied to our settings? Only a handful of generic methods for the construction of incentive
compatible mechanisms are known to date. Perhaps the most important of these constructions is the GVA method [5,10,20].
In a nutshell, GVA can be applied to the following setup: let X denote the set of possible outputs of the mechanism; each
participant has a valuation function vi : X → R depending only on the mechanism’s output, and the goal is to maximize
the total welfare. GVA is a direct mechanism. It chooses an output x ∈ X that maximizes the total welfare according to the
declaration vector vˆ . The payment of each agent i is deﬁned as
∑
j 	=i vˆ i(x)+hi(vˆ−i) where hi(.) is any function independent
of i’s declaration. (In particular, hi(.) is often deﬁned as the optimal welfare that can be obtained without agent i.) Roughly
speaking, the utility of an agent in GVA mechanisms is identiﬁed with the welfare measured by the declarations of the
other agents and its actual valuation. It is possible to generalize GVA by adding an artiﬁcial dummy agent whose valuation
represents the center’s preferences. On the surface it looks as if GVA can be applied to our setup. Yet, there is one crucial
difference that precludes this: the value of the center is dependent on the actual failure probabilities of the agents and
not only on the chosen allocation. Thus, if the computation of the payment is conducted according to the GVA formula, the
agents will have a clear incentive to report success probabilities of 1 and artiﬁcially raise the center’s value used to compute
their payments. Nevertheless, we can apply the principles behind GVA to obtain task allocation mechanisms with incentive
properties that resemble those of GVA. An application of GVA to our setup is demonstrated in Section 3.2.
2.5.2. Path procurement with failures
We now introduce a more complicated example that does not fall into our basic framework but into extensions of
it that will be deﬁned later. Consider the following path procurement problem: Given are a directed graph G with two
distinguished nodes s and t . Each edge e in the graph G is owned by a self interested agent o(e); an agent may own more
than one edge. The actual cost ce of routing an object along edge e is privately known to its owner o(e). The center has a
value V for procuring a path from s to t . The utility of each agent i is the difference between its payment ri and its actual
cost, i.e., ri −∑e∈P :o(e)=i ce , where P denotes the chosen s–t path.
In our framework each edge is a task. The center’s valuation equals V if the completion vector contains a path, and
zero otherwise. Note that this valuation is combinatorial. Various versions of the above problem were studied extensively in
recent years (e.g. [1,8,15]).
Now consider the natural possibility that agents may fail to route the object so it may get lost. This possibility adds
many complications to our basic setup. In particular, a lost object will not be routed further. Thus, the agents that need
to carry the object further will not be able to attempt their tasks, and therefore, their costs will be reduced. Consider, for
example, the instance in Fig. 3. Suppose that each edge is owned by a single agent. The lowest path is composed of two
edges. Suppose that the mechanism chooses this path. If the ﬁrst agent along the path completes its task e2, the second
agent will attempt e3 and bear the cost. On the other hand, if the ﬁrst agent fails, the second edge will not be attempted
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and the cost of its owner will be zero. In other words, the cost of agents may be dependent on the actual types of others.
As we shall see, this has implications for the properties of the mechanisms that can be obtained. Finally, we note that
while without failures, computing the optimal path can be done in polynomial time, the computation becomes much more
diﬃcult when failures are introduced.
3. Single task setting
We will start with the special case of a single task, in order to show our basic technique for handling the possibility of
failures. For expositional purposes, we will analyze two restricted settings (the ﬁrst restricts the probabilities of success to
one, and the second restricts the costs to zero), before presenting our mechanism for the full single-task setting.
Because there is only one task, we can simplify the notation. Let ci and pi denote ci1 and pi1, respectively. Similarly, we
let V = V ({1}) be the value that the center assigns to the completion of the task, and μ records the success or failure of
the attempt to complete it.
3.1. Case 1: Only costs
When we do not allow for failures (that is, ∀i pi = 1), the goal of EE reduces to assigning the task to the lowest-cost
agent. This simpliﬁed problem can be solved using the well-known second-price (or Vickrey) auction [20], with a reserve
price of V . In this mechanism, the task is assigned to the agent with the lowest declared cost, and that agent is paid the
second-lowest declared cost. If no agent’s declared cost is below the reserve price of V , then the task is not allocated; and,
if V lies between the lowest and second-lowest declared costs, then the agent is paid V .
3.2. Case 2: Only failures
We now restrict the problem in a different way and assume that all the costs are zero (∀i ci = 0). In this case, the goal
is to allocate the task to the most reliable agent.
Interestingly, we cannot use a straightforward application of the GVA for this case. Such a mechanism would ask each
agent to declare its probability of success and then assign the task to the agent with the highest declared probability. It
would set the payment function for all agents not assigned the task to 0, while the agent would be paid the amount by
which its presence increases the (expected) welfare of the other agents and the center: pˆ[1]V − pˆ[2]V (where pˆ[1] and pˆ[2]
are the highest and second highest declared probabilities, respectively). To see that this mechanism uses the GVA payment
formula, note that for all the agents except the one with the highest probability pˆ[1] , the optimal welfare with and without
the agent cancel each other out. For the winning agent, the welfare of the other agents equals the center’s expected value
pˆ[1]V . Without the agent, the best expected welfare equals pˆ[2]V , as all costs are 0. Thus, the agent’s payment follows.
Clearly, such a mechanism is not incentive compatible, because the payment to the agent depends on its own declared
type. Since there are no costs, it would in fact be a dominant strategy for each agent to declare its probability of success to
be one.
To address this problem, we alter our payment rule so that it also depends on the outcome of the attempt, and not
solely on the declared types, as it does in GVA. The key difference in our setting that forces this change is the fact that
the true type of an agent now directly affects the outcome, whereas in a standard mechanism design setting the type of an
agent only affects its preferences over outputs.
We accomplish our goals by replacing pˆ[1] with μ, which in the single task setting is simply an indicator variable that is
1 if the task was completed, and 0 otherwise. The payment rule for the agent is now V ·μ− pˆ[2] · V . Just as in the previous
restricted setting, this agent is the only one that has a positive expected utility for attempting the task, under this payment
rule. Speciﬁcally, its expected utility is V · (pi · (1 − pˆ[2]) − (1 − pi) · pˆ[2]), which is positive if and only if pi > pˆ[2] . Note
that this mechanism is incentive compatible. Thus, truth-telling is always the best strategy for the agents regardless of the
others’ types and declarations.
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Agent types used in an example
for Mechanism SingleTask
Agent ci pi
1 30 0.5
2 100 1.0
3 60 0.9
3.3. Case 3: Costs and failures
To address the full single-task setting, with both costs and failures, we combine the two mechanisms for the special
cases. Mechanism SingleTask, deﬁned below, assigns the task to the agent whose declared type maximizes the expected
welfare. The agent’s payment starts at a baseline of the negative of the expected welfare if this agent did not participate,
and it is then paid an additional V if it successfully completes the task.
The reader can verify that imposing the restriction of either pi = pˆi = 1 or ci = cˆi = 0 on each agent i except for the
“dummy” agent 0 (which always has p0 = 0 and c0 = 0) reduces this mechanism to the ones described above.
Mechanism 1. SingleTask
Let j ← argmaxk(pˆk · V − cˆk) {break ties in favor of smaller k}
f j(θˆ ) = {1}
r j(θˆ ,μ) = V · μ −maxk 	= j(pˆk · V − cˆk)
for all i 	= j do
f i(θˆ ) = ∅
ri(θˆ ,μ) = 0
end for
We remind the reader that the dummy agent never gets any payment so the indices above refer only to the real agents.
To exemplify the execution of Mechanism SingleTask, consider the types listed in Table 1. Let V be 210. If all declarations
are truthful, the task is assigned to agent 3, resulting in an expected total welfare of 0.9 · 210− 60 = 129. If agent 3 did not
participate, the task would instead be assigned to agent 2, for an expected welfare of 210(1.0) − 100 = 110. The payment
that agent 3 receives is thus 210 − 110 = 100 if it succeeds and −110 if it fails. Agent 3’s own cost is 60, and thus its
expected utility is 100(0.9) − 110(0.1) − 60 = 19.
Theorem 3.1. The SingleTaskmechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, EE.
The proof of this theorem is omitted because it follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
4. Multiple tasks
We now return to the original setting, consisting of t tasks for which the center has a non-combinatorial valuation. Be-
cause the setting disallows any interaction between tasks, we can construct a mechanism (MultipleTask, formally speciﬁed
below) that satisﬁes all of our goals by generalizing Mechanism SingleTask.
Mechanism 2. MultipleTask
for all i do
f i(θˆ ) = f ∗i (θˆ )
rˆi(μi) = Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−i)[W−i( f ∗(θˆ ), (μi,μ−i))] − Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )(pˆ−i)[W−i( f
∗
−i(θˆ−i),μ−i)]
end for
This mechanism allocates tasks to maximize the expected welfare according to the declared types. The payment rule
for each agent is divided into two terms. The second term is an offset equal to the expected welfare if agent i did not
participate. This term is independent of agent i. The ﬁrst term is a function of agent i’s completion vector μi . Given μi ,
the mechanism measures the expected welfare of all other participants Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−i)[W−i( f ∗(θˆ), (μi,μ−i))] according to
the declarations of the other agents. In this way, agent i’s payment does not depend on the true types of the other agents,
allowing us to achieve incentive compatibility. Note that for agents who are assigned no tasks, these two terms are identical,
and thus they receive zero payment. Note also, that μi affects only the center’s valuation but not the valuations of the other
agents. The mechanism is equivalent to the SingleTask mechanism applied to each task separately. Nevertheless, the above
formulation is more convenient to generalize.
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allocates S A to A1 and SB to A2. We shall now compute the contract offered to Agent 1. Let us ﬁrst compute the second
term. Without A1 both items will be allocated to A2. This yields an expected value of 300 · 0.7 + 200 · 0.9 = 390 to the
center and thus the second term is 390 − 170 = 220. Suppose that A1 completes its task. The expected center’s value
is then 300 + 0.9 · 200 = 480. Thus, the expected welfare of the others in this case is 480 − 90 = 390, and therefore,
rˆ({1}) = 390 − 220 = 170. When A1 fails, the center’s expected value drops to 180 and the expected welfare of the others
equals 90. Thus, rˆ({0}) = −130. Note that in this case the agent pays a ﬁne to the mechanism, which may be undesirable.
Currently, we do not know how to deal with this issue, or in general, how to minimize the risk that the agents face. The
expected utility of the agent is uA1 = (0.8 · 170− 0.2 · 130) − 100 = 10.
Theorem 4.1. TheMultipleTaskmechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, EE.
Proof. We will prove each property separately.
1. Individual Rationality (IR):
Consider an arbitrary agent i, a proﬁle of true types θ , and a proﬁle θˆ−i of declared types for all agents other than
agent i. We will show that agent i’s expected utility, if it truthfully declares its type, is always non-negative.
Let f ∗ = f ((θi, θˆ−i)). By the deﬁnition of the mechanism, the expected utility of the agent when it is truthful is:
ui = Eμi f ∗ ((pi ,pˆ−i))
[
rˆi(μi) − ci( f ∗i )
]
.
This utility is independent of the actual types of the other agents. Consider rˆi(μi). The second term of it, hi :=
Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )
(pˆ−i)[W−i( f ∗−i(θˆ−i),μ−i)], is independent of agent i.
Since the agent is truthful, ci( f ∗i ) = cˆi( f ∗i ). Observe that the total welfare equals W−i + ci(.). Thus,
ui = Eμi f ∗ (pi)
[
Eμ−i f ∗ (pˆ−i)
[
W−i
(
f ∗, (μi,μ−i)
)− cˆi
(
f ∗i
)− hi
]]
= Eμi f ∗ (pi)
[
Eμ−i f ∗ (pˆ−i)
[
W
(
f ∗, (μi,μ−i)
)]]− hi
= Eμ f ∗ ((pi ,pˆ−i))
[
W
(
f ∗,μ
)]− hi .
The ﬁrst term of the above expression is exactly the expected welfare measured according to (θi, θˆ−i). f ∗−i(θˆ−i) is a feasi-
ble allocation of the tasks among the agents. Since agent i does not get any tasks in it: hi = Eμ f ∗−i (θˆ−i )((pi ,pˆ−i))[W ( f
∗
−i(θˆ−i),
μ)]. Since f ∗ optimizes Eμ f ∗ ((pi ,pˆ−i))[W ( f ∗,μ)], the individual rationality follows.
2. Incentive Compatibility (DSIC):
Again consider an arbitrary triplet i, θ , θˆ−i . Let f ∗ = f (θi, θˆ−i) denote the allocation when agent i is truthful. Let θˆi
be another declaration for the agent and let f ′ = f ((θˆi, θˆ−i)) denote the resulting allocation. Let ui and u′i denote the
expected utilities of agent i in both cases. We need to show that ui  u′i . The same steps as in the individual rationality
case imply that:
ui = Eμ f ∗ ((pi ,pˆ−i))
[
W
(
f ∗,μ
)]− hi,
u′i = Eμ f ′ ((pi ,pˆ−i))
[
W ( f ′,μ)
]− hi .
(In both cases W is measured according to the actual cost of agent i.) Since f ∗ optimizes Eμ f ∗ ((pi ,pˆ−i))[W ( f ∗,μ)], the
incentive compatibility follows.
3. Individual Rationality for the Center (CR): We will actually prove the stronger claim that the center’s utility is always
non-negative for all true types θ , regardless of the declared type θˆ and output μ of the attempts.
Because the center’s valuation is non-combinatorial (additive), its utility can be described as a simple sum:
uM(g(θˆ),μ) =∑i(V (μi) − ri(θˆi,μ)).
We now show that all terms in this sum are non-negative. Consider an arbitrary agent i. Due to the payment deﬁnition:
V (μi) − ri(θˆi,μ) = V (μi) − Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ )(pˆ−i))
[
W−i
(
f ∗(θˆ ), (μi,μ−i)
)]+ Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )((pˆ−i))
[
W−i
(
f ∗−i(θˆ−i),μ−i
)]
.
Consider the second term of the above expression. The only inﬂuence μi has on W−i is to affect V (μi). Let W˜−i denote
the expected welfare of the other agents when agent i fails in all its tasks. Note that due to the additivity of the center’s
valuation W−i = V (μi) + W˜−i . Thus we get:
V (μi) − ri(θˆi,μ) = V (μi) −
(
V (μi) + Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−i)
[
W˜−i
(
f ∗(θˆ ),μ−i
)])+ Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )(pˆ−i)
[
W−i
(
f ∗−i(θˆ−i),μ−i
)]
= Eμ−i f ∗ (θˆ )(pˆ−i)
[
W−i
(
f ∗−i(θˆ−i),μ−i
)]− Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−i)
[
W˜−i
(
f ∗(θˆ ),μ−i
)]
.−i −i
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Agent types for proof of Theorem 4.2
θ1 : p11 = 1 c11 = 0 p12 = 0 c12 = 0
θ ′1 : p′11 = 1 c′11 = 2 p′12 = 0 c′12 = 0
θ2 : p21 = 0 c21 = 0 p22 = 1 c12 = 0
θ ′2 : p′21 = 0 c′21 = 0 p′22 = 1 c′22 = 2
In the last line, both terms compute the expected welfare ignoring agent i’s contribution to the center’s value and its
cost. The second term is equal to the expected welfare of an allocation that gives all the tasks in f ∗(θˆ)i to the dummy
agent. This is also a feasible allocation of the tasks to all agents but i. Thus, the optimality of f ∗(θˆ−i) implies that
Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )
(pˆ−i)
[
W−i
(
f ∗−i(θˆ−i),μ−i
)]− Eμ−i f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−i)
[
W˜−i
(
f ∗(θˆ ),μ−i
)]
 0.
Since this argument holds for every agent i, the center’s utility is always non-negative.
4. Economic Eﬃciency (EE): Immediate from the choice of the allocation f (·). 
4.1. Combinatorial valuation
So far we assumed that the center’s valuation is simply the sum of the values it assigns to each completed task. This
assumption is unrealistic in most settings. A natural generalization of our basic setting is to allow the center’s valuation
V (·) to be any non-decreasing function of the accomplished tasks. Unfortunately, in this setting, it is impossible to satisfy
all of our goals simultaneously. Before we show this let us note that this result is not surprising. In principle, budget balance
and eﬃciency do not mix well. In particular, it is known that even without failures, the payment of any path procurement
mechanism which must always procure a path can be much higher than the actual cost of the winning path [8]. It is not
diﬃcult to show that this result implies the impossibility to satisfy all our goals. Yet, our setup is more general and the
problem occurs already in very simple instances. Thus, for completeness, we formulate the theorem and the proof.
Theorem 4.2.When V is combinatorial, no mechanism exists that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
Proof. The basic intuition is as follows. Consider the case of two tasks, each of which can only be completed by one of
the agents. The center only has a positive value (call it x) for the completion of both tasks. Since both agents add a value
of x to the system, they can each extract a payment arbitrarily close to x from the center under an incentive compatible
mechanism. This causes the center to pay 2x although it will gain only x from the completion of the tasks.
The formal proof is by induction. We ﬁrst show that no mechanism exists that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for the
base case of n = t = 2. The inductive step then shows that, for any n, t  2, incrementing either n or t does not alter this
impossibility result.
Base case: Assume by contradiction that there exists a mechanism Γ1 that satisﬁes the four properties above for n = t = 2.
The four types that we will use in this proof, θ1, θ ′1, θ2, and θ ′2, are deﬁned in Table 2. The center only has a positive value
when both tasks are completed. Speciﬁcally, V () = V ({t1}) = V ({t2}) = 0, and V ({t1, t2}) = 3.
We will use three possible instances in order to derive properties that must hold for Γ1. In each instance, the true and
declared type of agent 2 is θ2.
Instance 1: Let the true and declared type of agent 1 be θ1. By EE, task 1 is assigned to agent 1, and task 2 is assigned to
agent 2. Formally, f1(θ1, θ2) = {1} and f2(θ1, θ2) = {2}.
The expected utility for agent 1 is simply its payment when both tasks are completed, because both agents always
complete their assigned task, and a1 has no costs.
Eμ f ((θ1,θ2))((p1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ2),μ, θ1
)]= r1
(
(θ1, θ2), (1,1)
)
.
Instance 2: Now, let agent 1’s true and declared type be θ ′1.
By EE, the task allocation would not change from the previous instance. Both tasks would still be completed, and agent
1’s expected utility would be:
Eμ f ((θ ′1,θ2))((p
′
1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ ′1, θ2),μ, θ ′1
)]= r1
(
(θ ′1, θ2), (1,1)
)− 2.
By IR, it must be the case that r1((θ ′1, θ2), (1,1)) 2.
Instance 3: In this instance, let agent 1’s true type be θ1 and let its declared type be θ ′1. Its expected utility would be the
same as in instance 2, except that agent 1 now has zero cost.
Eμ ′ ((p′ ,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ ′1, θ2),μ, θ1
)]= r1
(
(θ ′1, θ2), (1,1)
)
.f ((θ1,θ2)) 1
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an incentive to declare θ ′1, it must be the case that agent 1 is paid at least 2 in this instance.
r1((θ1, θ2), (1,1)) r1((θ ′1, θ2), (1,1)) 2.
Moving on to agent 2, due to the symmetry of the types, the same argument implies that r2(θ, (1,1)) 2. However, we
now see that the center has to pay too much to the agents.
Eμ f (θ)(p)
[
uM
(
g(θ),μ
)]= V ({t1, t2}
)− r1
(
θ, (1,1)
)− r2
(
θ, (1,1)
)
 3− 2− 2 = −1.
Since this violates CR, we have reached a contradiction, and proved the base case.
Inductive step: We now prove the inductive step, which consists of two parts: incrementing n and incrementing t . In each
case, the inductive hypothesis is that no mechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for n = x and t = y, where x, y  2.
Part 1: For the ﬁrst case, we must show that no mechanism exists that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for n = x+ 1 and t = y,
which we will prove by contradiction. Assume that such a mechanism Γ1 does exist.
Consider the subset of instances where n = x + 1 and t = y such that there exists an “extra” agent who has a cost of
1 and success probability 0 for every task. Because of EE, Γ1 can never assign the task to the extra agent. Because of IR,
Γ1 can never receive a positive payment from the extra agent. Since the only effect that the extra agent can have on the
mechanism is to receive a payment from the center, we can construct a mechanism that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for
all instances where n = x and t = y as follows: add the extra agent to the proﬁle of declared types, execute Γ1, and ignore
the payment function and assignment for the extra agent. The existence of such a mechanism contradicts the inductive
hypothesis.
Part 2: For the second case, we need to show that no mechanism can satisfy DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for n = x and t = y + 1.
We use a similar proof by contradiction, starting from the assumption that such a mechanism does exist.
Consider the subset of instances where n = x and t = y + 1 such that there exists an “extra” task te that is not involved
in any dependencies and for which the center receives no value from its completion. Since an assignment rule that never
assigns the extra task to an agent will never prevent the mechanism from satisfying the four goals, the existence of a
mechanism that satisﬁes these goals implies the existence of a mechanism Γ1 that satisﬁes the goals and never assigns the
extra task.
We can then reach a contradiction using a similar construction: create a mechanism for n = x and t = y that adds an
extra task and then execute Γ1. Since such a mechanism will satisfy DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for n = x and t = y, we have again
contradicted the inductive hypothesis, and the proof is complete. 
When CR is given up, it is possible to attain the other goals.
Theorem 4.3. TheMultipleTaskmechanism satisﬁes DSIC, IR, EE, even when V is combinatorial.
We omit the proof of this theorem, due to its similarity to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Intuitively, the potential for a
combinatorial V does not change the fact that the mechanism aligns the utility of the agents with the welfare of the entire
system. Moreover, the utility of an agent is still independent of the true types of the other agents.
In order to demonstrate the mechanism consider a situation in which the center wants to procure a pair of tasks A and
B . There are two agents A1 and A2 that are each capable of performing each of the jobs. A1 has zero cost and probability 1
for performing task A but has a high cost for performing task B . On the other hand, A2 has zero cost and probability 1 for
performing task B but a high cost for performing A. Suppose that the center’s value is 3 if both tasks are completed and 0
otherwise. Consider an application of the MultipleTask mechanism to this instance. Assume that both agents are truthful.
The mechanism will allocate task A to A1 and B to A2. Let us consider rˆ A1 ({1}). Without the agent, it is optimal to allocate
both tasks to the dummy agent and obtain zero welfare. Hence, E[W−1] = 0. Since the probability that A2 will succeed in
B is 1 and its cost is 0, Eμ−1 f ∗(θˆ)(pˆ−1)[W−1( f ∗(θˆ ), ({1},μ−1))] = 3. Thus, rˆ A1 ({1}) = 3. The case of A2 is similar. Since both
agents will succeed, the overall payment will be 6 causing the center a loss of 3.
4.2. Dependencies among tasks
We now consider the natural possibility of dependencies among tasks. We will study both the case of additive and
combinatorial center valuations. Consider, for example, the path procurement instance described in Fig. 3. Consider the
lower path. The agent that owns the second edge of the path can attempt to route the object only if it will be successfully
routed by the ﬁrst edge of the path. Thus, when this path is chosen, the cost of the second agent is dependent on the actual
type of the ﬁrst one.
We say that a task j is dependent on a set S of tasks if j cannot be attempted unless all tasks in S are successfully
ﬁnished. We assume that there are no dependency cycles. The tasks must be executed according to a topological order of
the underlying dependency graph. If a task cannot be attempted, the agent assigned to that task does not incur the costs of
attempting it.
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nism composed of the following stages:
Decision Given the declaration vector θˆ , the mechanism computes the allocation f (θˆ) and the payment functions rˆi(μ) of
all agents.
Work The agents attempt their tasks according to some arbitrary topological order that is computed before the decision
stage. The cost of each agent i is the sum of the costs of all its attempted tasks. If a task j was not attempted,
μ j = 0. The work stage is over when there are no more allocated tasks that can be attempted.
Payment Each agent i receives a payment of rˆi(μ) from the mechanism.
Remarks. It is possible to consider more complicated mechanisms that may retry or reallocate tasks. The positive results in
this section will hold for these cases but the decision stage will be even more complex from a computational point of view.
It is also natural to consider mechanisms in which the center may force agents to attempt dummy tasks that will cause
them artiﬁcial costs even when they cannot attempt their actual tasks. We leave these to future research. Note that, given
an allocation f and a vector of types Θ , the distribution over the completion vectors μ f (p) is no longer independent and
may be non-trivial to compute. We note that in this setup, it is assumed that the dependencies among the tasks are known
to the center.
Unfortunately, the possibility of dependencies also makes it impossible to simultaneously satisfy DSIC, IR, CR, and EE.
Theorem 4.4. When dependencies exist between tasks, even when the center’s valuation is non-combinatorial, no mechanism exists
that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
Proof. We will prove by contradiction that no mechanism can satisfy DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for the case of n = t = 2. By an
inductive argument similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.2, the result holds for all n, t  2.
Assume that there exists a mechanism Γ1 that satisﬁes DSIC, IR, CR, and EE for n = t = 2. We will use three possible
instances in order to derive properties that must hold for Γ1, but lead to a contradiction. The constants in these instances
are that task 2 is dependent on task 1 and that the center has a value of 5 for task 2 being completed, but no value for the
completion of task 1 in isolation. The ﬁve types that we will use, θ1, θ ′1, θ ′′1 , θ2, and θ ′2, are deﬁned in Table 3.
Instance 1: The true types are θ1 and θ2, and the declared types are θ1 and θ ′2. To satisfy EE in the case in which θ1 and θ ′2
are instead the true types, task 1 is assigned to agent 2, and task 2 to agent 1. That is, f1(θ1, θ ′2) = {2} and f2(θ1, θ ′2) = {1}.
Since agent 2’s true type is θ2, it will fail to complete task 1, preventing task 2 from being attempted. Thus, μ = (0,0) with
probability 1. The expected utility for agent 1 is then:
Eμ f (θ1,θ ′2)((p1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ1
)]= r1
(
(θ1, θ
′
2), (0,0)
)
.
Instance 2: The true types are θ ′1 and θ2, and the declared types are θ1, and θ ′2. Thus, the only difference from instance 1 is
agent 1’s true type, which is insigniﬁcant because agent 1 never gets to attempt a task. Thus, we have a similar expected
utility function:
Eμ f ((θ1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ
′
1
)]= r1
(
(θ1, θ
′
2), (0,0)
)
.
Instance 3: The true types are θ ′1 and θ2, and the declared types are θ ′1, and θ ′2. Agent 1’s declared type has been changed
to also be θ ′1. Both tasks will be allocated to the dummy agent: f1(θ ′1, θ ′2) = f2(θ ′1, θ ′2) = ∅. Therefore, μ = (0,0) still holds
with probability 1, and we get the following equations for the expected utility of the two agents:
Eμ f ((θ ′1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p
′
2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ
′
1
)]= r1
(
(θ ′1, θ ′2), (0,0)
)
,
Eμ f ((θ ′1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p
′
2))
[
u2
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ
′
2
)]= r2
(
(θ ′1, θ ′2), (0,0)
)
.
If r2((θ ′1, θ ′2), (0,0)) < 0, then IR would be violated if θ ′2 were indeed the true type of agent 2. Since the center thus
cannot receive a positive payment from agent 2, and it never gains any utility from the completed tasks, the CR condition
requires that r1((θ ′1, θ ′2), (0,0)) 0. Thus, agent 1’s utility cannot be positive: Eμ f ((θ ′1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p
′
2))
[u1(g(θ1, θ ′2),μ, θ ′1)] 0.
Table 3
Agent types for proof of Theorem 4.4
θ1 : p11 = 1 c11 = 2 p12 = 1 c12 = 1
θ ′1 : p′11 = 1 c′11 = 2 p′12 = 0 c′12 = 0
θ ′′1 : p′′11 = 1 c′′11 = 0 p′′12 = 1 c′′12 = 4
θ2 : p21 = 0 c21 = 1 p22 = 0 c12 = 0
θ ′2 : p′21 = 1 c′21 = 1 p′22 = 0 c′22 = 0
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agent 1 must not have an incentive to make this false declaration. That is, it must be the case that:
Eμ f ((θ1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ
′
1
)]= r1
(
(θ1, θ
′
2), (0,0)
)
 Eμ f ((θ ′1,θ ′2))((p
′
1,p
′
2))
[
u1
(
g(θ1, θ
′
2),μ, θ
′
1
)]
 0.
Instance 1: Now we return to the ﬁrst instance. Having shown that r1((θ1, θ ′2), (0,0))  0, we know that when agent 1
declares truthfully in this instance, its expected utility will be non-positive.
We will now show that agent 1 must have a positive expected utility if it falsely declares θ ′′1 . In this case, both tasks are
assigned to agent 1. That is, f1(θ ′′1 , θ ′2) = (1,1). We know that r1((θ ′′1 , θ ′2), (1,1))  4 by IR for agent 1, because if θ ′′1 were
agent 1’s true type, then both tasks would be completed and agent 1 would incur a cost of 4.
We now know that if agent 1 falsely declares θ ′′1 in instance 1, then:
Eμ f ((θ ′′1 ,θ ′2))((p1,p2))
[
u1
(
g(θ ′′1 , θ ′2),μ, θ1
)]= r1
(
(θ ′′1 , θ ′2), (1,1)
)− (c11 + c12) 4− 3 = 1.
Thus, agent 1 has an incentive to falsely declare θ ′′1 in instance 1, violating DSIC. Thus, we have reached a contradiction
and completed the proof for the case of n, t = 2. As stated before, this argument extends to all n, t  2. 
Intuitively, there are two main problems that are caused by dependencies—the ﬁrst is that they add a combinatorial
nature to the center’s valuation and the second is that we cannot avoid making an agent’s payment depend on the true
types of the other agents, because the tasks it attempts depend on the success or failure of the other agents. Next, we show
that in the general case, even without CR, one cannot expect incentive compatible mechanisms.
Theorem 4.5. When dependencies exist between tasks and the center’s valuation is combinatorial no mechanism exists that satisﬁes
DSIC, IR, and EE for any n 2 and t  2.
Proof (Sketch). The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4 and thus we only sketch it. Consider the following setup.
There are three tasks and two agents. The center’s valuation is V ({1,2}) = V (3) = 3. Task 2 is dependent on task 1. An
illustration to this setup is when the center needs to procure a path in a graph that contains two disjoined paths. One path
has two edges (1,2) and one has only one edge 3. Suppose that agent 1 is the only one capable of performing task 1 and
agent 2 is the only agent capable of performing tasks 2 and 3. Consider the case that agent 1 declares a zero cost and
success probability 1. Suppose that the actual success probabilities of agent 2 are 1 in both, task 2 and task 3. It is known
[15] that the payments that are offered to an agent are dependent only on the chosen allocation and the declarations of
the other agents. In other words, the mechanism must offer prices to agent 2 for each of the two task sets {1,2} and
{3}, which are independent of agent 2’s declaration. The mechanism must then choose the allocation that gives agent 2 a
maximal utility according to its declaration (see [15]). Let u2{1,2}(F ) denote the expected utility of agent 2 when the chosen
allocation is {{1}, {2}} and agent 1 fails, u2{1,2}(S) its expected utility when agent 1 succeeds, and u2{3} its expected utility
when the allocation {φ, {3}} is chosen (suppressing the costs of agent 2). It is always possible to set the costs of agent 2
such that u2{1,2}(F ) 	= u2{1,2}(S). Suppose that u2{1,2}(F ) < u2{1,2}(S). It is also possible to set the costs of agent 2 such that
u2{1,2}(F ) < u2{3} < u2{1,2}(S). But then the allocation that agent 2 prefers depends on the actual failure probability of agent 1.
In other words, if agent 1’s success probability is 0 yet it reports 1, it is better for agent 2 to report a cost that will cause the
mechanism to choose the allocation {φ, {3}}. Similarly, if agent 1 reports a small probability on task 1 but its actual success
probability is high, it is better for agent 2 to report a high cost for task 3 which will cause the mechanism to choose the
allocation {{1}, {2}}. This contradicts DSIC. The reasoning when u2{1,2}(F ) > u2{1,2}(S) is similar. 
In light of Theorem 4.5 we now abandon the notion of implementation in dominant strategies. Fortunately, we can still
provide equilibrium versions of our properties. We say that a vector of strategies is an equilibrium if no agent can get a
better contract by deviating to another strategy regardless of the actual types of the other agents. Our notion is weaker than
a dominant strategy equilibrium, but stronger than a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium, because the equilibrium does not depend
on any beliefs that the agents may have about the types of the other agents. We now deﬁne the equilibrium versions of our
goals.
Deﬁnition 6 (Ex-post incentive compatibility). A direct mechanism satisﬁes ex-post incentive compatibility (ICE) if:
∀i, θ, θ ′i , Eμ f ((θi ,θ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g(θi, θ−i),μ, θi
)]
 Eμ f ((θ ′i ,θ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g(θ ′i , θ−i),μ, θi
)]
.
In other words, in equilibrium, each agent gets the best contract by being truthful.
Deﬁnition 7 (Ex-post individual rationality). A direct mechanism satisﬁes ex-post individual rationality (IRE) if:
∀i, θ, Eμ f ((θi ,θ−i ))(p)
[
ui
(
g(θi, θ−i),μ, θi
)]
 0.
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end up losing, for example, due to their own failures.
Deﬁnition 8 (Ex-post economic eﬃciency). A direct mechanism satisﬁes ex-post economic eﬃciency (EEE) if it satisﬁes ex-post
IC and if:
∀θ, f ′(·), Eμ f (θ)(p)
[
W
(
f (θ),μ
)]
 Eμ f ′(θ)(p)
[
W
(
f ′(θ),μ
)]
.
We now deﬁne the Mechanism Ex-Post-MultipleTask, which differs from Mechanism MultipleTask only in that the ﬁrst
term of the payment rule uses the actual completion vector, instead of the distribution induced by the declarations of the
other agents.
Mechanism 3. Ex-Post-MultipleTask
for all i do
f i(θˆ ) = f ∗i (θˆ )
ri(θˆ ,μ) = W−i( f ∗(θˆ),μ) − Eμ−i f ∗−i (θˆ−i )(pˆ−i)[W−i( f
∗
−i(θˆ−i),μ−i)]
end for
While the ﬁrst term of the payment is calculated according to the actual completion vector μ, the second term depends
only on the reported types of the other agents.
Theorem 4.6. The Ex-Post-MultipleTask mechanism satisﬁes ex-post IC, IR, and EE, even when dependencies exist between the
tasks, and the center’s valuation is combinatorial.
Proof (Sketch). The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 and thus we only sketch it. From the deﬁnition of the setup,
given an allocation, the cost of each agent j is determined by the task completion vector, as this vector determines which
tasks the agent attempted. We denote the agent’s cost by c j(μ). The expected cost c j(μ) of the agent is thus determined
by the actual types of the agent and the allocation.
Ex-post Individual Rationality (IRE): Assume that all agents are truthful. We will show that the expected utility of each
agent i is non-negative. Let f ∗ = f (θ) be the resulting allocation. Recall that f ∗ maximizes the expected welfare. For every
completion vector μ, the agent’s utility is given by:
ui = −ci(μ) + W−i( f ∗,μ) − Eμ−i f ∗−i (θ−i )(p−i)
[
W−i
(
f ∗−i(θ−i),μ−i
)]
.
The last term is independent of agent i. We will denote it by hi . Given the completion vector μ, W ( f ∗,μ) = −ci(μ) +
W−i( f ∗,μ). Thus, by the linearity of expectation, the expected utility of the agent is given by:
ui = Eμ f ∗ (p)
[−ci(μ) + W−i( f ∗,μ)
]− hi
= Eμ f ∗ (p)
[
W ( f ∗,μ)
]− hi .
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the optimality of f ∗ implies that the second term is bounded by the ﬁrst, i.e. that ui  0.
Ex-post Incentive Compatibility (ICE): The equilibrium expected utilities of the agents are calculated as in the IR case. Apart
from that, the proof is identical to the IC part of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Ex-post Economic Eﬃciency (EEE): Immediate from the choice of f ∗ . 
Remark. In contrast to the previous setups we do not know how to generalize this result to the case of possible deliberate
failures. The reason is that failures may reduce the set of tasks that the agent will be able to attempt, and thus by failing,
the agent can reduce its own cost.
Example. Examine the path procurement example described in Fig. 3. Consider the Ex-Post-MultipleTask mechanism in
which the set of possible outputs is the set of all s–t paths (i.e., the mechanism either acquires one of the paths or no
path at all). Suppose that the upper edge e1 has a success probability of 0.1, and each of the lower edges e2 and e3 have
probability 0.5. Assume that all costs are 1 and the center’s value from a path completion is 20. Assume that agent 1 owns
e1, e2 and agent 2 owns e3.
Suppose that the agents are truthful and consider agent 2. The mechanism will choose the lower path {e2, e3}. The cost
of agent 2 now depends on agent 1. If agent 1 will not complete its task, the agent’s cost will be 0. Without the agent the
expected welfare is h2 = 0.2 · 20− 1 = 1. Consequently, the contract that will be offered to agent 2 will be:
rˆ2
({0,1,1})= (20− 1) − 1 = 18 (In this case u2 = 17),
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({0,1,0})= (0− 1) − 1 = −2 (In this case u2 = −3),
rˆ2
({0,0,0})= (0− 1) − 1 = −2 (In this case u2 = −2).
All other combinations are impossible. The expected utility of the agent will be 2.5. Note that the agent may lose even
when it does not attempt its tasks. Now suppose that the actual probability of e2 is 0 but agent 1 falsely reports it as 0.5.
In this case agent 2 will always lose. Thus, it is better for it to report a probability 0 and cause the mechanism to choose
the upper path. This lie would increase the agent’s utility to 0.
5. Cost veriﬁcation
The Ex-Post-MultipleTask mechanism presented in Section 4.2 has two drawbacks, which seem unavoidable in our basic
setup. First, the mechanism satisﬁes IR only in expectation (and in equilibrium). Therefore, participating agents may end up
with large losses. This phenomenon may sabotage business relationships between the center and the agents, lead to law
suits, etc. The second drawback is that the total payment might be very high, resulting in a negative expected utility to the
center. In other words, the mechanism does not satisfy CR.
Previous work [15] has stressed the importance of ex post veriﬁcation. That work considered a representative task-
scheduling problem and showed that when the center can verify the costs of the agents after the work has been done, the
set of implementable allocation functions increases dramatically. [15] did not consider the possibility of failures. We shall
show that both drawbacks mentioned above can be overcome when cost veriﬁcation is feasible.
Veriﬁcation assumption. The center can pay the agents after the tasks are performed. At this time the center knows the
actual cost ci of each agent i.
Below we deﬁne Mechanism Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus. This is a variant of the compensation and bonus mecha-
nism presented in [15]. The mechanism works as follows. Given the agents’ declarations, the mechanism allocates the tasks
optimally. After the work stage is over, the mechanism knows the actual cost of each agent. The mechanism compensates
each agent according to its actual cost. It then gives each agent a bonus proportional to the actual welfare.
Mechanism 4. Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus
The allocation f ∗(θˆ) maximizes the expected welfare E[W ]. Given strictly positive constants (χ1, . . . ,χn) the payments
are deﬁned as follows.
for all i do
The bonus of agent i is deﬁned as bi(θˆ ,μ) = χi · W ( f ∗(θˆ),μ)
The payment to agent i is ri(θˆ ,μ) = ci + bi(θˆ ,μ)
end for
Consider any ex-post IR mechanism. Since every agent must be paid at least its expected cost, an obvious bound u∗ on
the center’s expected utility is thus Eμ f ∗(θ)(p)[W ( f ∗(θ),μ)] = Eμ f ∗(θ)(p)[V (μ) −
∑
i ci]. The center can always decide not to
allocate any task, obtaining a utility of zero. Thus, u∗  0.
Theorem 5.1. Under the veriﬁcation assumption, the Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus mechanism satisﬁes ex-post IC, IR, EE, and
CR, even when dependencies among the tasks exist and the center’s valuation is combinatorial. Moreover, for every  > 0 and a type
vector θ , when the constants χi are small enough, the expected center’s utility is at least u∗ · (1− ).
Proof. We start with ex-post IC. Consider agent i and assume that the other agents are truthful. The cost of the agent is
compensated for by the mechanism. As a result, its utility equals its bonus.
When the chosen allocation is f ∗ , the expected bonus of the agent equals χi · E[W ( f ∗,μ)] (from the linearity of expec-
tation). When the agent is truthful the mechanism computes the allocation according to the actual type vector. In this case,
the chosen allocation is exactly the one that maximizes E[W (.,μ)], and henceforth, the agent’s own expected utility.
Ex-post IR is satisﬁed since when the agents are truthful, the expected welfare of E[W ( f ∗,μ)] is clearly non-negative.
Ex-post EE is satisﬁed by the choice of the allocation.
If the optimal expected center’s utility is zero, then so is the expected bonus and hence the expected center’s utility of
the mechanism. Otherwise, u∗ > 0. The center’s utility thus equals Eμ f (θ)(p)[V (μ) −
∑
i(ci + χi · W ( f ∗(θ),μ))]. By linearity
of expectation, and the optimality of the allocation, this equals u∗ · (1 −∑i χi). By choosing
∑
i χi   we get the desired
bound on the expected utility of the center. 
Remarks. It is possible to generalize mechanism Ex-Post-CompensationAndBonus by adding to the payment ri(.) a function
hi() that is independent of agent i′s declaration and actions. In particular, if we let W−i denote the optimal expected welfare
which can be obtained without agent i and deﬁne the bonus as χi · (W ( f ∗(θ),μ)) − W−i) we get that agents that do not
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potential losses.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we studied task allocation problems in which agents may fail to complete their assigned tasks. For the
settings we considered (single task, multiple tasks with combinatorial properties, and multiple tasks with dependencies),
we provided either a mechanism that satisﬁes our goals or an impossibility result, along with a possibility result for a
weaker set of goals. Interestingly, the possibility of failures, forced us to abandon the strong concept of dominant strategies.
It is worth pointing out that many of our results hold when the set of possible failures is expanded to include rational,
intentional failures. Such failures occur when agents try to increase their utilities by not attempting assigned tasks (and
thus not incurring the corresponding cost). Intuitively, our positive results continue to hold because the payment rule aligns
an agent’s utility with the welfare of the system. If failing to attempt some subset of the assigned tasks increased the
overall welfare, these tasks would not be assigned to any agent. Obviously, all impossibility results would still hold when
we expand the set of possible actions for the agents. Our positive results can also be extended to various settings in which
the set of the possible decisions is more complex. Among the possible extensions are the reattempting of tasks after failure,
sequential allocation of tasks, and task duplications. Such extensions can lead to a signiﬁcantly higher utility for the center
and lower risks for the agents, but can also complicate the computation of our mechanisms even further.
Many interesting directions stem from this work. The computation of our allocation and payment rules presents non-
trivial algorithmic problems. The payment properties for the center may be further investigated, especially in settings where
CR must be sacriﬁced to satisfy our other goals. Similarly, it is possible that the CR and EE properties can be approximated.
This work did not investigate this possibility.
We believe that the most important future work will be to consider a wider range of possible failures, and to discover
new mechanisms to overcome them. In particular, we would like to explore the case in which agents may fail maliciously
or irrationally. For this case, even developing a reasonable model of the setting provides a major challenge. This is because
it is not clear how to model the way that the strategic considerations of rational agents are affected by the presence of
irrational or malicious agents.
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Appendix A. Notes on the computation of our mechanism
FTMD problems give rise to non-trivial computational problems. All the mechanisms in this paper require the computa-
tion of optimal allocations and the agents’ payments. This section brieﬂy comments on these computations.
A.1. Computing optimal allocations
In the single task setup, the task simply needs to be allocated to the agent i that maximizes pi V − ci . This can be
computed in O (n) time. When there are t tasks and the center’s valuation is additive, the computation can be done for
each task separately. A computation time of O (n · t) thus suﬃces for the additive case. The combinatorial setup is by far
more diﬃcult. In the most general case, even describing the center’s value requires exponential space. Thus, it may be more
interesting to consider speciﬁc problems in which the structure of the center’s value facilitates some compact represen-
tation. Unfortunately, in many such cases, computing the optimal allocation is at least as hard as computing some joint
probabilities, which is often PSPACE hard. One such example is a variant of our path procurement example (Section 2.5.2) in
which the mechanism is allowed to procure any subset of the edges of the graph. A principle-agent problem with a similar
underlying allocation problem was shown to be PSPACE hard in [3]. Their argument can be adopted to our setup as well.
An intriguing question is whether it is possible to approximate the optimal allocation and construct payment functions
that yield incentive compatible mechanisms. Thus far, except for cases in which the agent types are one dimensional, this
approach has rarely succeeded. We leave this to future research.
A.2. Computing the payments
The payments in the single task or the additive cases can clearly be computed in polynomial time.
Consider the combinatorial setup. In all the mechanisms described in this paper, the payments are calculated according
to either an actual or expected welfare (given the allocation, costs, and the declared failure probabilities). While the actual
welfare can easily be computed in polynomial time, the computation of an expected welfare is likely to be hard. Fortunately,
given the allocation and costs, the welfare is simply a bounded stochastic variable and can therefore be approximated by
standard sampling of the failure probabilities.
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